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Introducing the Issues.
State Of The Union in Historiographical Perspective
Jean-Christian Vinel
1 It is no exaggeration to say that the twentieth century has been both a blessing and a
bane for  US labor unions.  While  it  witnessed an era of  social  upheavals  that,  unlike
previous  ones,  generated  an  important  and  unprecedented  legislative  effort  (and,
notably,  a collective bargaining law that matched those adopted in countries such as
France), the twentieth century also saw US unions decline to a parlous state. The Wagner
Act  notwithstanding,  the  proportion  of  unionized  workers  in  the  private  sector  has
shrunk to 7%—a grim figure indeed.
2 Seen from the early days of the twenty‑first century, the history of American unions in
the past century thus looks like a full circle. Nothing better exemplifies this full circle,
Nelson Lichtenstein tells us, than the language of a Burger King application form. In this
form, the prospective “franchisee” (who, notably, is not technically a “worker”) agrees to
an “employment‑at‑will” status, whereby he can be fired “at any time, for any reason.”
Lichtenstein finds  this  application form rather  daunting—such,  indeed,  was  the legal
status of American workers before the New Deal. American workers are now back in the
legal and political twilight zone where they were before what French historians call the
“legalization of the working class,” that is, the official recognition of its existence, of its
institutions, and of its weapons.1
3 How, Lichtenstein wonders, could a right to organize be formally enacted, implemented,
and then abandoned? The thrust of State of the Union is to shed light on the intellectual,
cultural, and political dynamics that contributed to the rise and fall of the union idea in
the 20th century.  By doing so,  Lichtenstein breaks  with the historical  mien that  had
animated labor history since the 1970s, when a generation of social historians linked to
the New Left had fully transformed the agenda of labor history. By moving its focus away
from the labor unions,  they had emphasized the social  and cultural  dynamics of  the
construction of class consciousness, at home and in the workplace. Thus, these “new”
labor historians had uncovered the radicalism and the militancy of American workers,
and derided the long‑held idea that American workers were beholden to the capitalist
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system as a mere functionalist assumption.2 More recently, another line of inquiry has
been inaugurated to determine how the state, through its structures and policies, has
affected the labor movement.3
4 Interestingly,  in  State  of  the  Union labor  history seems to  experience a  fresh shift  in
emphasis—it abandons the bottom up and the statist perspective for a labor‑intellectual
history writ large. Notably, Lichtenstein does not tell us that workers have no agency and
should recede into the background. He still believes that, in E.P. Thompson’s words, “class
is made, not given.” Only, he adds yet another layer of analysis by showing that class is
also constructed and deconstructed through ideas, policies and legal concepts in what
Habermas has called the public sphere.4 “The fate of American labor is linked to the
power of the ideas and values that sustain it,” he explains. Accordingly, the rise and fall of
the “labor question” becomes the interpretive framework through which the history of
the American worker is analyzed. 
5 The product of this effort is a rich synthesis that cuts against the account of 20th‑century
labor history established by the New labor historians, which has it that in the aftermath
of  the  New  Deal,  instead  of  working  to  develop  true  working  class  politics,  unions
accepted to be incorporated into a political order designed to fine‑tune capitalism. Thus,
State of the Union does not simply tell us the story of American workers in the twentieth
century, it also tells us much about the state of the New Labor History and the political
perspective that has sustained it.
State of the Union
6 In  a  recent,  new  introduction  to  his  first  book,  Labor’s  War  at  Home (1982),  Nelson
Lichtenstein explained that this book was the “product of the political and ideological
debate  that  engaged  my  New  Left  generation  when,  in  the  early  1970s,  so  many
campus‑based radicals inaugurated a remarkable probe into the character, meaning, and
history of the working class and its institutions.”5 In the early 1980s,  this probe had
resulted in a fresh vision of the 1930s and 1940s, one that stressed an enormous loss of
opportunity.  Indeed,  New Left  historians found the twentieth century to be a  mixed
archival bag. While they could see the 1930s as a “turbulent era,” they met with deep
disappointment  in  the  post‑war  period,  for  by  then  bureaucratic  unions  and  a
wage‑conscious  working  class  seemed  to  have  traded  social  activism  for  business
unionism and the  comfort  of  prosperity.  In  their  opinion,  the  early  1940s  were  the
endpoint of labor militancy and solidarity.6
7 Thus, in Labor’s War at Home, Nelson Lichtenstein argued that during the second World
War, American unions went from militancy to accommodation through the acceptance of
no‑strike pledges and the overall doctrine of industrial pluralism. That transformation,
however, had to be imposed on militant locals where at times workers revolted against
the  unions’  leadership.  Union  leaders,  Lichtenstein,  argues,  were  enticed  by  a
Mephistopheles‑like  State  to  renounce  their  militant  power  and  trade  it  off  for
institutional security. They agreed to that pact in the hope that the labor‑liberal alliance
would  bring  about  a  political  economy in  which labor  and business  would  be  equal
partners—a dream that never came true. 
8 Moreover,  supplementing this  perspective  was  the “critical  school,”  a  group of  legal
scholars who derided the Wagner Act as a snare and a delusion.  Far from liberating
workers, this law had actually lured them into believing that collective bargaining and
grievance procedures would put them on equal footing with management, but it actually
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only enlisted them in a system aiming to thwart militancy. The right to organize, one
scholar  concluded,  is  but  a  “counterfeit  liberty,”  designed  to  ensure  the  workers’
submission to the capitalist order.7 
9 The most striking feature of State of the Union is that it operates a sharp break with this
vision. Indeed, Lichtenstein is much more appreciative of the efforts of liberals and labor
reformers, who, he agrees, helped set up a new system of industrial relations that the
workers would not have gotten by themselves. Most importantly, Lichtenstein repudiates
the idea that the working class had become submissive and passive in the 1950s, and
1960s, when workers were still facing the same shop‑floor issues as in the 1930s, and were
equally or more adamant in dealing with them. The main problem with the Wagner Act,
Lichtenstein tells us, is not that it was a delusion or a snare, but rather that it did not go
far enough to transcend racial  and gender fault‑lines that  ran across 1930s America.
Finally,  and  most  significantly,  Lichtenstein  parts  ways  with  the  theory  of  the
labor‑management  accord—labor  unions  wanted  much  more,  and  corporate  America
tolerated what it could not refuse. The labor contracts of the 1950s and 1960s were the
product of a stand off, not of a truce. 
10 What we witness as we read State of the Union, in a sense, is therefore the decline of the
New Leftist paradigm. Replacing this paradigm is a narrative that refuses to postulate
that the New deal collective bargaining regime collapsed of its own conservatism. Instead,
it focuses on the forces (and Lichtenstein finds plenty of them) that embattled and finally
weakened this  regime.  The  1950s  and 1960s  take  center  stage,  since  these  were  the
decades  that  bred  the  cultural  and  ideological  dynamics  that  eroded  the  notion  of
industrial democracy. 
11 How can we account for this shift? Two explanations seem to be in order. The first one is
purely historiographical.  Although it has constituted the standard account for twenty
years, the idea that during the 1940s the American State enticed the labor movement to
shed its radicalism and accept the capitalist regime has come under increasing pressure.
As early as 1994, Melvyn Dubofsky had challenged much of the critical school in a study
that argued that the impact of state polices on the labor movement was much more
ambiguous  than  had  been  acknowledged.  “The  State  liberated  as  well  as  leashed.  It
offered a real as well as a counterfeit liberty,” he concluded.8 More recently, a few case
studies have dealt important blows to the New Left vision. While he believed the case of
the United Packinghouse Workers of America to be an exception, Rick Halpern had to
admit  that  this  union  had  not  sought  to  curb  shopfloor  militancy  in  the  name  of
responsible unionism. Nor had it established a strong, central organization—it actually
maintained very democratic processes that did not alienate the rank and file from the
union’s bureaucracy.9 
12 Other scholars have been even blunter.  Daniel  Clark has demonstrated that Southern
textile workers went to great lengths to retain the kind grievance procedure that New
Left scholars had derided as a fraud. Mill owners, not the workers, were the ones trying to
get rid of an arbitration system that handed too many victories to the union. According to
Clark, there is no mistaking the enormity of the changes brought about by the union and
the labor contract. It was, in the words of one worker “like night and day.”10 Jack Metzgar
agrees in a recent study of the 1959 steel strike. “If what we lived through in the 1950s
was not liberation,” he says, “then liberation never happens in real human lives.” Like
Clark, Metzgar not only shows that the SWOC had an enormous impact on the lives of the
steelworkers, but also that the contracts it wrested from the management of US Steel
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were  the  workers’  best  protection  against  their  owners’  anti‑union  policies.11 Both
scholars take their fellow historians to task for having systematically derided the unions
and their achievements in the postwar period.12 
13 Historiography,  however,  is  only  one  part  of  this  new  outlook.  As  Kevin  Mattson
explained in his recent Intellectuals in Action, the aim of the New Left was to further the
New Deal impulse, not criticize it to death.13 Today, for labor activists, the question is no
longer whether another form of unionism is possible, but rather if any form of unionism
can be fostered. In the 70s, a rising wave of labor militancy seemed to indicate that the
unions were obsolete bureaucratic institutions, the collective bargaining regime a golden
cage. In the aftermath of labor unions’ decline, such a regime takes on a much more
satisfying aspect. As Lichtenstein himself explains, “In the early 21st century, when the
proportion of all union workers hovers just above 13%, organized labor’s incorporation
into a claustrophobic state apparatus seems far less of an issue than survival of those
same unions, not to mention the revival of a socially conscious, New Deal impulse within
the body politic.” 
14 In  the  course  of  this  reevaluation  of  the  New  Deal,  historians  have  developed  an
appreciation for unions and the State.  While the former are key to defending Social
Security or, developing national health insurance programs, enlisting the latter in the
protection of labor’s activities now appears as a necessity. As Barbara Ehrenreich and
Thomas Geoghegan explained in their recent call to “light labor’s fire,” rebuilding the
unions on a voluntary basis simply won’t do. Workers need the protection of the State if
they are to overcome the opposition of management. Thus, this historiographical shift is
also inherently political. 
th
15 The consequences to this paradigmatic shift are not, of course, totally visible yet. Still, it
is worthwhile to try to ponder them. First and foremost, the notion of a New Deal order,
which has been so far the most influential way to problematize the 20th century seems
now more questionable. The thrust of the whole notion of a “new deal order” was a sharp
critique of the New Deal, which had abetted administrative structures and procedures
that simultaneously empowered workers and led them to accept the capitalist  order.
Indeed, in Lichtenstein’s words, what had jelled in the 1940s was an “American system of
interclass accommodation,” which had done away with the labor question and thwarted a
possible American social democracy.14 
16 Yet, if there was indeed no labor‑management accord, then it becomes quite difficult to
find in the labor relations of the 40s and 50s the stability necessary to foster anything
close to a “New Deal Order.” Consequently, labor’s alliance with the Democratic Party
becomes much less problematic, for it now seems that corporate America’s determination
to oppose the empowerment of union and its means to bring that determination to bear
were simply too strong,  with or without a totally independent labor movement.  The
possibility  of  a  social‑democratic  America,  to  which  the  New  Deal  order  was
counterpoised, seems more distant. 
17 More  importantly,  however,  is  one  idea  coming  out  of  State  of  the  Union,  that  the
1930‑1970s period may not constitute a coherent whole,  in that such a periodization
conceals a major shift in American political culture. In de‑emphasizing labor’s political
alliances to focus on the substance and on the public debate and its evolution, the book
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suggests that the century can be divided into two distinct periods: a laboristic society
from the 1910s to the late 1950s and a pluralist society from the 1950s onwards. 
18 From the progressive era to the 1950s,  Lichtenstein demonstrates that the debate on
industrial democracy was a function of the construction of what Sumner Slichter himself
called a “laboristic society,” in which unions were seen by many liberals as the engine of
progress. By way of contrast, from the early fifties on, in the wake of the defeat (not the
moderation) of the New Deal impulse, class politics eroded and receded, thus paving the
way for the emergence of a “pluralist society,” in which rights gained preeminence. The
problem, then, is not that there was not enough working class consciousness or militancy
in the 60s, but rather that labor unions were powerless because they were trapped in a
political  rhetoric  that  had died in  the  late  40s  and early  50s—they were  thoroughly
unprepared to contribute to a  political  debate based on rights  rhetoric  and pluralist
assumptions. As Lichtenstein shows, notwithstanding the working class unrest that was
evident in the 60s, any form of revitalization of New Deal corporatism was impossible
because in this pluralist age, unions had disappeared from the liberal imagination.
19 This has implications for the way we see the fifties. In the traditional progressive account
of the 20th century, the fifties stand as an historical aberration. Not only are they marred
by McCarthyism, but they were dominated by a social conservatism that stood in sharp
contrast to the yeasty years of the radical 1960s. In the words of historian Robert Zieger,
in  the  1950s  “America  seemed  to  have  abolished  the  very  idea  of  a  working  class.
Ensconced in suburban comfort, performing technical and managerial tasks, affluent to
the point of satiation, the American worker had come a long way.” 
20 By contrast, Lichtenstein differentiates between public discourse and social reality—the
fifties were an “unquiet decade” riddled with social strife, he argues. Rather, he portrays
the 50s as the pivotal decade of the 20th century, the very moment when the American
public  discourse,  took  on  a  distinctive,  idiosyncratic  tone—under  the  concurrent
influence  of  intellectuals  and the  civil  rights  movement,  abandoned class  politics  to
embrace a form of pluralism that fostered individual rights—a rhetoric that, in the 1960s,
would replace class in the minds of many people, including workers, as a venue for social
empowerment. Thus, the fifties become a crucial period to understand what is peculiar
about twentieth century American social history. 
21 The essays included here discuss State of the Union from various angles. In the first essay,
“Nelson  Lichtenstein  vs. Nelson  Lichtenstein,”  Donna  Kesselman  provides a
three‑pronged  critique  of  State  of  the  Union.  First,  Kesselman,  a  savvy  reader  of
Lichtenstein’s previous work, shows that one of the main points of State of the Union—the
idea that the postwar labor relations regime was the product of a huge defeat—can be
made only by renouncing a criticism of the New Deal which had been a hallmark of
Lichtenstein’s earlier work, and which, according to her, is missing in State of the Union.
Overall,  she  finds  the  book’s  celebration  of  the  New  Deal  labor  relations  regime
unwarranted.  Kesselman,  however,  does  not  simply  point  to  contradictions  in
Lichtenstein’s  work,  she  also  offers  ideas  of  her  own.  Indeed,  she contends  that  the
terminology used by American historians to analyze the history of labor is inadequate in
so much as it masks the peculiarities of that history. Unlike their European counterparts
unions have had to play multiple political roles, and only an acute consciousness of their
peculiar mission will  make it possible to assess their fate in the postwar era. Finally,
Kesselman  discusses  the  ideas  Nelson  Lichtenstein  offers  to  rejuvenate  the  labor
movement. In a provocative and insightful conclusion, Kesselman argues that those ideas
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are strikingly close to those of Walter Reuther, the leader of the UAW whose career and
legacy have been a focus of Lichtenstein’s work. Walter Reuther, Kesselman concludes,
has won Lichtenstein over to his cause.
22 In  the  second  essay  of  this  collection,  “Class,  Race  and  Labor,”  Catherine  Collomp
challenges one of Lichtenstein’s main points—that American unions’ decline was in many
ways caused by the rise of the civil rights agenda, which emphasized individual rights at
the expense of class. According to Collomp, the rise of civil rights politics was the product
not the cause, of the decline of organized labor. Indeed, she remarks, only after the labor
movement  had been tamed in  the  late  1940s  did  the Federal  Government  enter  the
struggle for racial equality. Thus, the shift in power relations that occurred in the 60s
took  place  in  an  American  polity  which  had  already  been  cleansed  of  the  radical
aspirations of its social movements. 
23 The 1960s are also at the heart of Romain Huret’s essay. In “Does the ‘Working Poor’
Exist?,” Huret moves the focus of the analysis away from the social and political realm to
the Federal State and its experts. Lichtenstein, along with a host of commentators, thinks
that the American Left and the Johnson Administration were at odds over the poverty
question, because while the left advocated structural reform, the Johnson Administration
focused on the cultural aspects of poverty. Huret, however, shows that a group of federal
experts actually tried to design the structural policies that unions and the American left
were demanding.  Yet  surprisingly,  American unions never took much interest  in the
protection of the “working poor” that those experts unsuccessfully tried to put at the
forefront  of  the  liberal  agenda.  The  60s,  according  to  Huret,  were  indeed  a  “lost
opportunity”  for  unions,  for,  had  they  joined  the  war  on  poverty,  they  could  have
prevented the “labor question” and the “social question” from becoming two separate
and independent strands of the liberal agenda.
24 In the last essay, this author challenges yet another element of the book—the idea that
the Wagner Act operated a redefinition of American citizenship. The Wagner Act, I argue,
was  not  akin  to  a  reconstruction of  American  democracy.  Indeed,  there  were  two
contemporary readings of the Wagner Act—a “philosophical” and an “economic” one. The
former conceived of the right to organize as a fundamental one, while the latter saw it as
a means to an end, a technique to raise wages. Unlike Lichtenstein, I contend that the
economic reading of the law largely prevailed over the philosophical one. Moreover, I
argue that the true constitutional innovation of the law was its broad redefinition of the
powers and role of the Federal government. The Wagner Act created a Federal agency—
the National Labor Relations Board—which, like its progressive forebears, was designed to
promote the public interest through virtuous and disinterested expertise. However, the
NLRB never enjoyed the legitimacy that it needed to carry out its mission. Instead, its
work gave rise to an ever bigger political controversy. In the end I show the NLRB failed
because the protection of the right to organize was not predicated on a social contract.
25 Nelson Lichtenstein gives all the above commentaries a long and thoughtful answer in a
final rejoinder that speaks both the vitality of the debate on 20th‑century labor history
and to his impressive mastery of the issues. Then, in an interview, Marianne Debouzy
reflects on the parlous state of the union movement and on the intellectual debates which
it  has  stirred.  Finally,  Alexis  Chommeloux,  Dominique  Daniel,  Romain  Huret,  Claude
Julien, and Joseph McCartin have contributed book reviews that offer a glimpse of the
rich and exciting work that has animated the field of American Labor History in the last
ten years.
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